Understanding the saving behavior of poor households: evidence from Egypt by Helmy, Imane Abdel Fattah
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
2-1-2015 
Understanding the saving behavior of poor households: evidence 
from Egypt 
Imane Abdel Fattah Helmy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Helmy, I. (2015).Understanding the saving behavior of poor households: evidence from Egypt [Master’s 
thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/167 
MLA Citation 
Helmy, Imane Abdel Fattah. Understanding the saving behavior of poor households: evidence from Egypt. 
2015. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/167 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
  
 
The American University in Cairo 
 
School of Business 
 
 
 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE SAVING BEHAVIOR OF POOR HOUSEHOLDS: 
EVIDENCE FROM EGYPT 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
 
Economics Department 
 
 
 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Arts in Economics 
 
 
 
By: Imane Abdel Fattah Helmy 
 
 
 
 
Under the supervision of: 
 
Dr. Samer Atallah 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2015 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
   
 
First and foremost, thanks Allah for granting me the strength, patience and persistence 
throughout my master’s journey. 
 
I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Dr. Samer Atallah, Assistant Professor of 
Economics, American University in Cairo, for his valuable guidance, encouragement and 
support throughout this research. It honors me to work under his supervision. 
 
I would like to thank my readers, Dr. Mohammed Bouaddi and Dr. Mohamed El-Komi, 
Assistant Professors of Economics, American University in Cairo, for the time they 
dedicated to read my research and give me valuable comments. 
 
I owe my sincere gratitude to Dr. Adel Beshai, Professor of Economics and Director of 
Graduate Studies, American University in Cairo, for supporting me during my study 
period and for being such a great professor and adviser. 
 
Last but not least, I am grateful to my family and friends who continuously supported me. 
This study would not have been possible without their support, love and care. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
The American University in Cairo 
School of Business 
Economics Department 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE SAVING BEHAVIOR OF POOR HOUSEHOLDS: 
EVIDENCE FROM EGYPT 
 
 
Imane Abdel Fattah Helmy 
 
Under the supervision of Dr. Samer Atallah 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Given that there is a recent growing interest in mobilizing savings of poor households, 
this study investigates the factors that affect household saving in Egypt using a probit 
model. It uses data of the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) carried out in 
2012. Also, it tests the impact of accessing credit on informal and formal saving. The 
results of the study show that the determinants of informal saving are quite different from 
formal saving. For example, access to credit significantly increases the probability of 
saving among the poor. However, credit increases informal saving while it has an 
insignificant effect on formal saving. This suggests that there is little evidence on the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between formal borrowing and formal saving since there 
is a weak incentive to convert informal savings of the poor into formal deposits. Females 
have higher tendency to save, yet they save informally which highlights the need for 
gender-sensitive saving products. Also, health emergencies have a significant negative 
effect on informal saving of poor households while insurance reduces the use of savings 
as Out Of Pocket (OOP) expenditures on health. Therefore, policies in Egypt should 
develop an inclusive financial system that increases awareness and confidence in the 
financial market and improves access to financial services. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Different theories attempted to explain household’s saving behavior. However, 
there is little agreement on which theory offers the most comprehensive explanation. In 
developing countries, many arguments highlighted the limitations of traditional saving 
theories in explaining the saving behavior of poor households. Therefore, this study aims 
at understanding the saving behavior of poor households in Egypt and identifying key 
determinants of saving. Differentiating between the determinants of informal and formal 
saving is a contribution of this study since the determinants of informal saving in 
developing countries are rarely tackled in the literature. Furthermore, there is a noticeable 
gap in the literature that addresses the synergy between access to credit and saving. 
Hence, this paper will test the impact of access to credit on the saving of poor households 
including informal and formal saving.  
Poor households have different needs for financial products to mitigate risks, cope 
with shocks, finance life-cycle events and invest in business. Nevertheless, three out of 
every four adults in developing countries do not save in formal financial institutions 
(Kendall, 2010a). Given their limited options in the formal financial sector, they often 
have resort to informal arrangements. Studies showed that poor households could actively 
save if they have access to affordable and convenient saving products. Recently, formal 
microsaving products started to gain more recognition. Governments, institutions and 
donors, believing that access to saving will empower the poor and enable them to better 
manage their financial affairs, adopted microsaving programs and policies.  
Understanding key determinants of saving will guide financial institutions in 
designing tailored saving products that meet the needs of poor households and compete 
with informal saving. This study will also provide policy implications to mobilize formal 
savings of poor households in Egypt. The study uses a probit model to analyze micro 
level data of the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) that was carried out in 2012 
on a sample of 12,060 households including 49,186 individuals.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter Two discusses household 
saving theories and provides an overview of the saving behavior of poor households in 
developing countries including informal saving and formal saving, known as 
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microsaving. This will be followed by discussing saving in Egypt. Chapter Three presents 
the research problem and objectives. Afterwards, model specification and data will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five and Six presents the descriptive statistics and 
estimation results respectively. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the paper and discusses 
policy implications.  
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Chapter Two: Literature review 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides an overview of 
theories related to household’s saving behavior followed by discussing empirical studies 
that tested these theories in developing countries. It also explains other micro 
determinants that affect the decision of saving. The second section focuses on saving by 
poor households including informal and formal saving which is known as ‘microsaving’. 
It discusses the historical evolution of microfinance, explores empirical evidence on the 
impact of microsaving and the potential interaction between credit and saving. The final 
section discusses poor household’s saving in Egypt. 
 
2.1. Determinants of household’s saving 
2.1.1. Theories of household’s saving  
National saving includes public and private saving. Household saving typically 
constitutes a major part of private saving compared to private corporations (Gersovitz, 
1988; Rehman, Bashir, & Faridi, 2011). Saving is an important way to improve the well-
being of household. It allows households to smooth consumption in case of high income 
volatility and increase the opportunity to invest in physical and human capital (Ashraf et 
al., 2003). For households, the tradeoff between current and future consumption results in 
saving (Sturm, 1983).  
There are numerous motives leading to the decision of saving. For instance, 
saving for retirement aims at financing future consumption when income decreases or 
becomes zero (life-cycle). Also, households save when there is uncertainty about future 
income (precautionary saving) or when they intend to leave bequests (Sturm, 1983; 
Gersovitz, 1988). Additional motives include, improvement (increasing consumption) or 
intertemporal substitution (enjoying interest), investing in business or accumulating 
down-payment of durables (Browning & Lusardi, 1996; Coleman, 1998; Karlan & 
Morduch, 2009).  
Income is identified as a significant determinant of saving. Early saving theories 
that identified current income as a key determinant of saving started by the standard 
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Keynesian model. This model implied that saving depends on current income ceteris 
paribus. When income increases, part of the increase is used for consumption while the 
rest is saved. Therefore, as equation 1 shows, when income increases, saving rate 
increases: 
                                                                   𝑺𝒕 = 𝒂 + 𝒔𝒀𝒕 + 𝜺                                            (1) 
such that 𝑆𝑡 denotes savings in period t while 𝑌𝑡 is the income in period t and s is a 
constant marginal propensity to save (MPS) that ranges from zero to one. As income 
increases, average propensity to save (APS) increases (Mikesell & Zinser, 1973; Liu & 
Hu, 2012).   
The tests of this equation showed that saving increase with income at a decreasing 
rate. A potential explanation is that a shift in household’s income to higher levels will 
introduce households to modern consumption opportunities leading to a decreasing 
saving rate (Mikesell & Zinser, 1973; Liu & Hu, 2012). The implication of Keynesian 
theory is that low income households save lower ratio of their income compared to high 
income families. Different theories, that attempted to explore the relationship between 
income and saving, were contradictory. For instance, it was found that the poor consume 
at their subsistence level, yet they often have little saving to smooth consumption in case 
of income shocks (Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb, & Corsetti, 1992; Meghir, 2004).  
Income fluctuations can also affect saving. An insightful theory supporting this 
notion was introduced by Friedman (1965), the permanent income hypothesis. Permanent 
income hypothesis has the below linear form: 
                                             𝑺𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝒀𝑷𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐𝒀𝑻𝒕                             (2) 
such that 𝑆𝑡 is savings and 𝑌𝑃𝑡 is permanent income in period t while 𝑌𝑇𝑡 is transitory 
income. The common definition of permanent income is long-term expected income that 
does not take into consideration temporary influences like weather or rainfall gains. 
Transitory income denotes the difference between actual income 𝑌𝑡 and permanent 
income.  
The implication of permanent income hypothesis is that individuals do not 
consume transitory income (𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑇 = 1) so temporary changes in transitory income will 
directly affect household saving (Schmidt-Hebbel et al., 1992; Meghir, 2004). Friedman 
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based his work on the intuition that income is more volatile than consumption. 
Consumption is based on long-term expectations about income since households prefer to 
smooth consumption over time and avoid short-term fluctuations (Meghir, 2004). The 
implication of this theory on household behavior is that household will save today if their 
income is higher than the future and vice versa. For example, in economic crises current 
income becomes lower than future income so people dissave to cover current 
consumption (Berry, Williams, & Waldron, 2009).  
Income uncertainty also determines saving as indicated by Leland (1968). He 
defined precautionary saving as additional saving due to uncertainty about future income. 
When there is higher uncertainty about future income, the marginal utility of expected 
consumption in the future becomes higher leading to more saving at the present time 
(Deaton, 1997; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & Servén, 2000; Jongwanich, 2010). For 
instance, if a household is working on a temporary basis or expects to lose the job, 
current saving will increase (Berry et al., 2009). Coleman (1998) added that 
precautionary saving is witnessed in all stages of life. For example, students who are 
uncertain about earning as expected in the future can save while elderly who wish to save 
for protection against shock could also have precautionary saving.  
 Age is another determinant of saving that was recognized by the life-cycle 
hypothesis developed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). This theory was mainly 
concerned with the motive of saving for retirement. It assumed that agents prefer to 
smooth consumption over their life span. Therefore, they save when they are young and 
working by consuming less than the disposable income while dissaving take place when 
they are old and retired (Figure 1). By this way, wealth is maximized at retirement age 
then decreases as consumption increases after retirement. Hence, saving is positive at 
young age, negative at old age and averaging zero if no bequests are made or received 
during the life time.  
This theory assumes that there is zero population and income growth. Thus, the 
dissaving of elderly offset the saving of young population. If this assumption is relaxed, 
the net saving will be positive due to a larger young population earning income compared 
to retired one. Also, if per capita income is growing, saving will increase to maintain 
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future level of consumption since households aim at smoothing their consumption over 
life time (Mikesell & Zinser, 1973). This theory shows that household saving behavior is 
determined by the length of income earning period, retirement duration, market interest 
rate, time preference and risk aversion (Sturm, 1983). 
 
 
Figure 1 Life-Cycle Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on life-cycle hypothesis, Diamond (1965) presented an Overlapping 
Generation Model (OLG) by extending the analysis of Samuelson (1957). The model 
assumed that there are three markets (labor, output and capital) and two living 
generations who are overlapping. Each person lives for two periods of time. The person 
works during the first period so the time is divided between leisure and work. During the 
second period, the person retires then dies by the end of period. Since there are no 
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transfers or bequests, the wage, earned at the first period, is divided between consumption 
and saving. In the second period, the consumption of the person is financed by savings 
plus interest rate (Romer, 2011). 
Deaton (1989) argued that some of the aforementioned theories have limited 
application in developing countries where the demographic structure is different. The size 
of household is larger in poor countries and when grandparents, children and 
grandchildren live at the same household, there is lower motive to save for retirement due 
to intergenerational transfers. Also, in developing countries, income is mostly coming 
from agriculture activities so uncertainty is higher which hinders the accurate estimation 
of long-term income. Due to credit constraints, households face difficulties in borrowing 
so a primary motive for poor households is to save for consumption smoothing. As result, 
saving in developing countries better fits precautionary saving instead of saving for 
retirement or bequest.   
 
2.1.2.  Empirical evidence of household’s saving 
This section presents key contribution of empirical studies that aimed at testing 
the aforementioned theories in developing countries. These empirical studies have not 
reached a decisive conclusion about which theory offers the most comprehensive 
explanation of the saving behavior of poor households. For instance, an empirical study 
in India, using time series data from 1950 to 1962, showed that current income has a 
positive signifficant effect on saving in rural and urban areas (Choudhury, 1968).  
Wen and Ishida (2001) investigated rural saving in China by analyzing data of 
farm households from 1979 to 1998 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The study 
found a positive significant relationship between current income and saving at 1% 
significance level. In additon, Ahmad and Asghar (2004) found that current income has a 
major significant impact on saving using OLS technique to analyze Pakistan Integrated 
Household Survey of 14,307 households in 1998-99. In Morocco, Abdelkhalek et al. 
(2010) analyzed household data of 300 households using OLS and instrumental variables. 
The results of the study supported the standard Keynesian model.  
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On the other hand, Burney and Khan (1992) pointed out that income has 
insignificant impact on saving using data of household income and expenditure survey in 
Pakistan. Rehman et al. (2011) reached the same conclusion by analyzing data of  293 
Pakistanian households who were selected using stratified random technique in 2009-
2010. Likewise, Liu and Hu (2012) tested the Keynesian theory using panel data of 
family surveys from thirty one urban and rural regions in China during the period from 
1990 to 2009. The findings of the paper indicated a positive relationship between 
household saving ratio and income, yet the results were not significant in the rural model. 
Early empirical studies attempting to test life-cycle hypothesis included the study 
of Kelly and Williamson (1968) that was conducted in Indonesia using cross-sectional 
data of 490 households in 1959. The findings of the study showed little evidence on life-
cycle hypothesis in rural and urban Indonesia. Also, the empirical work of Deaton (1992), 
using household data of Côte d’Ivoire in 1985-1987 and Thailand in 1986, found weak 
evidence on life-cycle hypothesis. The data did not show the expected dissaving at old 
age and even in urban Thailand, there was evidence of saving after the age of 40. 
Recent studies included the study of Abdelkhalek et al. (2010) in Morocco and 
Rehman et al. (2011) who found evidence of life-cycle hypothesis only among higher 
income group in Pakistan. This finding supported the limitation of life-cycle hypothesis 
in developing countries as suggested by Deaton (1989). Likewise, the papers of Liu and 
Hu (2012) in China found weak evidence on the relationship between age and saving.  
Other studies in Chile, Pakistan and Kenya found significant evidence supporting 
the life-cycle hypothesis (Burney & Khan, 1992; Butelmann & Gallego, 2001; Ahmad & 
Asghar, 2004; Kibet et al., 2009). Their analysis showed that saving and age exhibit an 
inverted U-shape relationship since saving increases at young age till reaching a certain 
threshold then decreases. In Vietnam, Newman et al. (2008) analyzed surveys of 2,324 
households in 2006. The findings of the paper supported life-cycle hypothesis. 
Some studies conducted in developing countries to test the permanent income 
hypothesis found larger estimates of marginal propensity to save out of transitory income 
compared to permanent income. However, these studies were challenged by selecting 
sound proxies for permanent and transitory income while avoiding measurement error. 
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The results of studies differed according to the way of defining permanent and transitory 
income (Snyder, 1974). For instance, studies supporting permanent income hypothesis 
like Bhalla (1980) in India used lagged income and assets as measure of permanent 
income while Musgrove (1979) in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru used education.  
Using data about weather and rainfall in India, Wolpin (1982) found evidence 
supporting permanent income hypothesis. A study in Thailand by Paxson (1992) used 
time series data to estimate the marginal propensity to save out of transitory income 
resulting from rainfall shocks. The findings suggested that the marginal propensity to 
save out of transitory income range between 0.73 and 0.83. Thus, the extra income from 
transitory rainfall is saved while consumption is positively affected by permanent income 
which is supporting permanent income hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, studies that used lagged income (two-year average income) found 
weak evidence on permanent income hypothesis (Friend & Taubman, 1966; Choudhury, 
1968). Gupta (1970) criticized these papers for using one single measurement of 
permanent income and using nominal data of some variables instead of real data. 
Therefore, he analyzed the same models using real data and defining permanent income 
as two-year moving average of real per capita income and three-year moving average. 
Still, the results pointed out that the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory 
income is higher than permanent income. 
Using estimate of prudence as proxy of household’s motive to accumulate 
precautionary savings, the study indicated a positive relationship between prudence and 
saving. By analyzing household panel data, additional studies found evidence on 
precautionary saving that increases as uncertainty about future income increases 
(Skinner, 1987; Kazarosian, 1997; Carroll & Samwick, 1998). Using household data of 
rural Pakistan from 1986 to 1991, Lee and Sawada (2010) found strong evidence of 
precautionary saving particularly among poor households who face frequent income 
shocks. 
Moreover, Liu and Hu (2012) found that precautionary saving theory has stronger 
power in explaining household saving behavior in China compared to Keynesian and life-
cycle hypothesis which supports the argument of Deaton (1989). Even though Dynan 
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(1993) found evidence on precautionary motives, the estimated parameter was too small 
which was not consistent with previous studies. However, the paper was criticized for 
using four-quarter panel data which is too short to capture income uncertainty 
(Kazarosian, 1997).  
Additional determinants of saving were identified by studies like Sturm (1983), 
Suruga and Tachibanaki (1991), Burney and Khan (1992), Butelmann and Gallego 
(2001), Ahmad and Asghar (2004), Abdelkhalek et al. (2010), Rehman et al. (2011), 
Kahn (2013). High young and old dependency ratio has a significant negative impact on 
saving. Stable occupation has a positive impact on saving while wealth (e.g. owning a 
house) increases the rate of saving (Chowa, Masa, & Ansong, 2012).  
Attaining high education was found to reduce saving rates since people with low 
educational attainment are more risk averse than educated persons so they save more for 
the future (Burney & Khan, 1992; Kahn, 2013). Additional explanation was offered for 
this inverse relationship by Rehman et al. (2011). They mentioned that highly educated 
households prefer to highly educate their children so they use their savings to finance 
educational expenditures.  
Sex of the head of household has been considered as a determinant of saving. It 
was expected that women save more for children education and household well-being. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies found that male headed households are able to 
accumulate more savings since female headed households receive lower income (Ahmad 
& Asghar, 2004; Kibet et al., 2009; Abdelkhalek et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the study of 
Abdelkhalek et al. (2010) indicated that women save more by taking into account an 
interaction term between gender and income while Kahn (2013) found no significant 
difference between the two sexes.  
Life expectancy is positively associated with saving while debts lead to increased 
saving rate to cover the repayment (Suruga & Tachibanaki, 1991; Burney & Khan, 1992; 
Kahn, 2013). Gersovitz (1988) agreed with Deaton (1992) by indicating that 
intergenerational links affect household saving behavior in developing countries more 
than developed nations. Family members play signifcant role in insuring against risk in 
case of market imperfections and liquidity constraints. Therefore, the family structure 
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allowing for intergenerational transfer decreases the motive to accumulate savings. The 
empirical studies of Kelly and Williamson (1968) as well as Musgrove (1979) supported 
this argument.  
More recent studies like Oberta (2006) used instrumental variable to estimate the 
saving function of households in Pakistan. The study showed that increasing the number 
of children has a significant negative effect on saving. Also, similar findings were 
indicated by Ahmad and Asghar (2004), Abdelkhalek et al. (2010) and Rehman et al. 
(2011). On the other hand, Kahn (2013) reported mixed findings because higher family 
size increases saving if children contribute to wealth. 
Based on the aforementioned discussion, saving is particularly important for 
households in developing countries who face frequent income shocks and high liquidity 
constraints. In the absence of well-developed credit and insurance markets, saving 
becomes a significant mechanism that protects households against emergencies and 
finances their investment or life-cycle events. Therefore, the next section of the paper 
will be concerned with saving mobilization of poor households in developing countries.  
 
2.2. Saving behavior of poor households in developing countries  
2.2.1.  Informal saving  
The most common form of saving by poor households is informal saving. 
Mechanisms of informal saving include saving at home (cash, livestock, gold, jewelry, 
assets) and reciprocal lending or Rotating Saving and Credit Association (ROSCA) 
(Hulme et al, 2009). Informal saving also includes parties like moneylenders, relatives, 
friends, neighbors and saving groups (Rutherford, 1996; Bayulgen, 2008; Mawa, 2008).  
According to Rutherford (1996), ROSCA is the most commonly used type of 
informal saving in the world. For example, more than fifty percent of adults in Africa are 
members of ROSCAs (Kendall, 2010a). In its basic form, ROSCA is formed by a group 
of people who collect their savings and pay a lump sum amount to one person. 
Afterwards, turns are changed over time in a rotating manner. The order of getting the 
lump sum amount could be decide by agreement, lottery or auction. Also, informal saving 
12 
 
could be time-bound and conditional on certain events like Christmas, marriage or 
funeral funds (Rutherford, 1996).  
Advantages of informal saving include availability and accessibility without the 
need to travel long distance as well as lower cost since there are no opening fees. 
However, informal saving usually faces the risk of theft, loss or spending on needy 
family and friends under social pressure. Also, informal saving that involves networks of 
neighbors and friends lacks privacy and requires intensive coordination. As result, 
accessible formal saving accounts could be more effective if regulated by secured 
financial institutions since the poor will be tempted to save more in secure and private 
arrangements (Kendall, 2010b). 
Rutherford (1996) indicated that the poor prefer to use formal financial services 
but if they are not available, they make their own arrangements. Thus, informal saving is 
widespread in developing countries where financial and insurance markets are 
underdeveloped and exclude the poor (Rutherford, 1999; Hulme et al, 2009). When 
barriers to save are reduced and the poor have access to affordable and reliable formal 
products, they are motivated to save in order to cope with emergencies and finance life-
cycle events (Aportela, 1999). Therefore, the next section will discuss formal saving in 
developing countries which is known as microsaving.  
 
2.2.2.  Formal saving of poor households: microsaving 
The concept of microfinance was used interchangeably with microcredit which 
offers the poor, who do not have access to credit, a small amount of money as a 
collateral-free loan. Over the years, microfinance evolved to include more comprehensive 
services like microsaving and microinsurance (Stewart et al., 2010; Duvendack et al., 
2011). In this context, microfinance is defined as offering small financial services to the 
poor who had been excluded by conventional financial systems due to the high risk and 
administrative costs (Schreiner, 2003; Bayulgen, 2008; Mawa, 2008).  
The major players in microfinance industry are categorized into: semi-formal 
players such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Microfinance Institutions 
(MFIs). Formal players include public and private banks, insurance companies and post 
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office (Elahi & Rahman, 2006; Bayulgen, 2008; Mawa, 2008). The main clients of 
microfinance are the economically active poor who have little income as well as basic 
skills and need financial services to help them manage their money or run their own 
income generating activities (Rutherford, 1996).  
The majority of microfinance clients are women since they are more vulnerable 
and have less access to formal financial services. Also, there is a common belief that 
women invest more than men in activities that have better impact on the welfare of the 
whole household (Brau & Woller, 2004; World Bank, 2008). This belief was supported 
by empirical studies like Hassan and Guerrero (1997), Pitt and Khandker (1998) and 
Zhibin (2008). 
Originally, microfinance started with providing access to credit giving that the 
credit market in developing countries is divided into formal institutions that are often 
reluctant to lend the poor and informal lenders who lend the poor with extremely high 
interest rates (Jaffer, 1999). Additionally, Matin, Hulme and Rutherford (2002) argued 
that the poor live in a 'mini-economy' where production, consumption, borrowing and 
saving are very small. This increases the per unit transaction cost of formal credit 
providers. Moreover, the risk associated with offering financial services to the poor is 
high due to the fluctuating earnings from instable jobs, natural shocks and sudden 
medical expenses.   
A key problem in providing credit is asymmetric information resulting from lack 
of credit history of the poor. This asymmetry leads to adverse selection, which is “the 
inability of lender to differentiate between low and high risks borrowers” as well as 
moral hazard which is “the tendency for some borrowers to divert resources to projects 
that reduce their likelihood of being able to repay the loan and the inability of the lender 
to detect and prevent such behavior” (World Bank, 2008, p.114). Hence, MFIs use joint-
liability (group lending) as a tool to reduce the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard 
through peer pressure and networking (World Bank, 2008). 
Scholars like Pitt and Khandker (1996), Hermes and Lensink (2007) and Dercon 
(2009) argued that lack of financial services is a major constraint that prevents the poor 
from pursuing valuable opportunities and keeps them in the trap of poverty. In the 
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absence of well-functioning financial market, the poor who are “unbankable” have resort 
to informal networks like moneylenders, relatives, neighbors and friends (Jaffer 1999; 
McKernan, 2002; Banerjee & Duflo, 2007).  
Following these arguments, microcredit became one of the highest priorities on 
development agendas after the first microcredit program, Grameen Bank (GB), was 
founded by Muhammed Yunus in 1970s in Bangladesh (Anslinger, 1997; Elahi & 
Rahman, 2006). There are common features shared among microcredit programs. For 
instance, the size of the loan is usually small and the repayment period is short. In 
addition, a common purpose of the loans is to finance income-generating activities (Elahi 
& Danopoulos 2004).  
Given the global scope of microcredit, there is increasing number of studies 
measuring its impact. Using different survey designs like treatment versus control group 
(with or without intervention), longitudinal studies (before or after intervention) and 
Randomized Control Trial (RCT), studies found mixed evidence on the impact of 
microcredit (Duvendack et al., 2011). As Bangladesh has constantly kept the lead in 
offering microcredit services since the establishment of GB, several studies attempted to 
investigate the impact of microcredit in Bangladesh. Some empirical studies found 
positive impact of microcredit on income, employment, wealth, asset ownership and 
women empowerment (Khandker & Chowdhury, 1996; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Hossain, 
2000; Amin et al., 2003; Ghosh & Wright, 2005; Osmani, 2007; Haque & Yamao, 2008).  
Other studies examined the impact of microcredit in developing countries like 
Zimbabwe, India, Zambia and Philippines. These studies supported the positive effect of 
microcredit on the well-being of poor household including income, health, children 
education and the improvement of women decision-making (Barnes, Keogh & 
Nemarundwe, 2001; Chen & Snodgrass, 2001; Copestake, Bhalotra, & Johnson, 2001; 
Kondo et al., 2008).  
Nevertheless, some studies found that microcredit has insignificant impact on the 
well-being of households after correcting for selection bias (Coleman, 1999; Khandker, 
2003). By the same token, RCT studies showed that microcredit have insignificant impact 
on education and health (Banerjee et al., 2009; Karlan & Zinman, 2009). More recent 
15 
 
RCT studies in Bosnia, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Mongolia and Morocco found that 
microcredit does not have significant impact on income, children status and women 
empowerment (Attanasio et al., 2015; Angelucci, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015; Augsburg et 
al., 2015; Banerjee et al., 2015a; Crépon et al., 2015; Tarozzi et al., 2015). Therefore, 
Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman (2015b) concluded that microcredit does not have 
‘transformative effects’ even if it has average positive impact on household.    
Even though access to credit assists the poor in facing different shocks, 
microcredit increase the risk of debt. Therefore, offering saving products to the poor is 
considered as a ‘safer’ intervention to mitigate the long-term debt (Stewart et al., 2012). 
In some cases, microcredit led to falling prey to ‘never-ending cycle of debts’ due to high 
interest rates. As result, MFIs started to offer microsaving products to assist poor 
households in running their business without costly debts (Ashraf et al., 2003).  
The historical focus of microfinance movement on microcredit was originated 
from the assumption that the poor can not save. Nevertheless, this assumption was 
challenged by numerous studies. The poor can save, yet they require specific products 
that meet their needs due to their low irregular income and distant location (Karlan & 
Morduch, 2009). As indicated by Bayulgen (2008) providing loans is a crucial part of 
microfinance, yet microsaving is equally important since saving allow the poor to keep 
money for future investments or shocks.  
Microsaving allows low-income persons to save small frequent amounts of money 
through saving products with low opening fees (Hulme et al., 2009). Poor households 
often find difficulties in having lump sum cash to be used in investment (e.g. running 
business or acquiring productive assets) and life-cycle events (e.g. marriage, birth, 
education). Weather shocks, health emergency and loss of job are common shocks that 
have particular adverse effect on poor households (Kendall, 2010a).  
Therefore, saving has high return by protecting the poor against income shocks 
and reducing risk of employing stressful risk coping strategies like decreasing 
consumption, getting children out of school and sale of assets. Also, frequent savings can 
be converted into lump sum amounts to meet the anticipated needs and special events of 
poor households (Rutherford, 1999; Hulme et al., 2009; Kahn, 2013).  
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Given the previously mentioned debate about the impact of microcredit and 
whether it opens new opportunities for borrowers or trap them in a debt-cycle, claims 
about shifting MFIs operation to other services like microsaving started to increase 
(Rogg, 2000). Some studies indicated that saving could be more beneficial for the poor as 
it helps in paying back loans, smoothes consumption and finances education and 
investment (Chen & Snodgrass, 2001; Adjei et al., 2009; Karlan & Morduch, 2009; 
Stewart et al., 2010).  
The wide belief that the poor can not save was challenged by the introduction of 
formal microsaving products in developing countries and the high take up realized for 
these products compared to other financial services including loans. For instance, in 
2012, there were 72 million clients of microsaving products compared to 94 million 
microcredit clients (Karlan, Ratan & Zinman, 2013). In Indonesia, when Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI) introduced microsaving products, they attracted ten times higher number 
of clients compared to borrowers. Furthermore, surveys from different countries showed 
that having access to saving account is reported as the highest financial need of the poor 
(Kendall, 2010b).  
The study by Banerjee and Dufflo (2007), ‘The economic lives of the poor’, 
analyzed household surveys of thirteen developing countries1. The findings indicated that 
poor households are able to save if there is access to convenient saving accounts. They 
spend substantial amount of their annual income on life-cycle events as well as social and 
religious festivals which increase the potential of mobilizing savings. Twelve out of 
thirteen countries in the survey had less than fourteen percent of poor household with 
access to saving accounts. Therefore, they have resort to informal ROSCAs and self-help 
groups (Banerjee & Dufflo, 2007).  
The poor have uneven cash flow while their needs require lump-sum amounts 
(e.g. investment or special event). Therefore, they are able and willing to save if there is a 
secured and convenient place that meets their financial needs and converts their small 
amounts into lump sum. Nevertheless, there are barriers to save like long geographical 
                                                 
1 Countries included in the study: Cote d'Ivoire, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, and Timor Leste (East Timor). 
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distance of saving institution which increases transaction costs of poor households 
(Rutherfold, 1996; Karlan & Morduch, 2009; Karlan et al, 2013). Some studies attempted 
to explore the effect of expanding services through closer branches to the poor, mobile 
branches, deposit collectors and ATM cards. The studies in India, Mexico and Kenya 
found significant positive effect of removing distance barriers due to reducing cost of 
time and money (Aportela, 1999; Burges & Pande, 2005; Flory, 2011; Schaner, 2013).  
Additional barriers include unaffordable saving accounts with high opening fees, 
minimum balance and withdrawal fees as well as the complicated procedures (Hulme et 
al., 2009; Karlan et al, 2013). Moreover, lack of trust or confidence in formal institutions 
and low financial literacy act as barriers of saving. When these barriers are removed, the 
poor are eager to save through formal secured channels (Aportela, 1999; Rutherford, 
1999; Kendall, 2010b; Karlan et al, 2013).  
In order to accommodate the needs of low-income persons, microsaving products 
have some common features like: being convenient, easy to access, require payment of 
small frequent sums and low opening fees (Mutesasira et al., 1998). Also, saving can be 
offered as compulsory products in order to get a loan or as voluntary product (Stewart et 
al., 2012). Forced saving are more common and they are used by MFIs as collateral to 
secure loans so their refund is restricted while voluntary saving are more flexible (Brau & 
Woller, 2004).  
The literature of microsaving could be mainly divided into two types. The first 
type includes studies assessing the demand of microsaving as well as profiling potential 
clients. These studies commonly use financial diaries to get in-depth information about 
household profiles and their financial lives (Bakeine, 2001; Rutherford, 2002; Ruthven & 
Kumar, 2002; Collins, 2005). Other studies that used randomized control trials indicated 
that when the poor have access to saving products with low or zero opening fees, there is 
high uptake and intensity of account usage even if there are interest-free accounts (Duflo, 
Kremer & Robinson, 2009; Ashraf et al., 2010; Dupas & Robinson, 2010; Brune et al., 
2011). This uptake was even higher compared to credit products. Dupas and Robinson 
(2010) found that women have higher tendency to save for investing in business which 
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was explained by the authors as the result of reduced pressure on women from their 
networks.  
The second type of studies focused on the impact of microsaving. Studies 
measuring the impact of microsaving on the welfare of poor households vary from RCT 
and natural experiment to client interviews and focus groups. These studies found 
positive impact of microsaving on poverty reduction, education, resistance to health 
shocks, food expenditures, decision-making of women within household and purchase of 
durable goods (Kervyn, 2001; Ashe, 2005; Burgess & Pande, 2005; Ashraf et al., 2010; 
Dupas & Robinson, 2010; Prina, 2013). Nevertheless, there is a limited number of impact 
assessment studies about microsaving compared to microcredit (Stewart et al., 2010; 
Kendall, 2010b). 
 
 
2.2.3. The synergy between access to credit and saving 
According to Karlan et al. (2013) the interaction between borrowing and saving 
received little attention from researchers even though they are simulatenously offered by 
financial institutions to form saving habits that last even after the loan is fully paid. Also, 
Stewart et al. (2012) mentioned that there is lack of evidence on the impact of credit on 
voluntary saving since the majority of studies focused on the common compulsory saving 
required by financial institutions. 
Theories of household saving imply that access to credit will reduce saving 
because the motive of precautionary saving or saving for investment will decline. Savers 
will be discouraged to reduce current consumption to save for investment or life cycle 
events (Rogg, 2000). Additionally, even though entrepreneurs are encouraged to save any 
additional profit from the projects financed by credit, the debt repayment could be a 
barrier leading to decreased saving of borrowers (Stewart et al., 2012). 
The paper of Deaton (1992) argued that barriers to borrow do not imply that 
households can not save. On the contrary, liquidity constraints increase current saving in 
order to secure future expenditures. For instance, when there is limited access to credit, 
household has to save the whole amount to get durable goods or houses. Coleman (1998) 
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added that potential liquidity constraints in the future can affect saving even if 
households are not currenty facing liquidity constraints. When households are aware that 
they will not be able to borrow money in the future to cover any emergency, their current 
consumption and saving are influenced. Nevertheless, Gersovitz (1988) argued that 
households are not better-off due to liquidity constraints because higher saving is 
different from improved welfare. 
Chaudhuri (1999) analyzed longitudinal data of three villages in India and showed 
that acess to credit reduces saving. Similar findings were reported by a study in Kenya 
that used multi-stage sample technique to select 359 households from seven districts 
(Kibet et al., 2009). Additionally, the empirical findings of Jongwanich (2010) showed 
that access to credit decreases the saving rate. By the same token, Lee and Sawada (2010) 
used household panel data and found that liquidity constraints in Pakistan increase 
precautionary saving.  
Even though Erulkar and Chong (2005) compared between ‘before and after’ data 
of borrowers in Kenya and found out that credit increased saving, using the same 
methodology in Indonesia and Peru showed that there is negative impact of credit on 
personal saving (Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001; Takahashi, Higashikata & Tsukada 2010). 
Moreover, the study of Adjei et al. (2009) in Ghana indicated that the longer the period of 
participation in microcredit program, the lower the saving. Finally, a study in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina using the rigorous methodology of RCT pointed out that credit decreased 
saving particularly among business owners and highly educated households (Augsburg et 
al., 2012). On the other hand, empirical evidence from Uganda and Zimbabwe showed 
that access to credit increased the level of saving (Barnes, Keogh & Nemarundwe, 2001; 
Barnes, Gaile & Kibombo, 2001).  
Aportela (1999) reported limited evidence on the ‘crowd-out’ effect that occurs 
when access to formal financial services reduces informal saving. By the same token, 
Barnes et al. (2001) indicated that in Uganda poor households prefer to keep their savings 
in informal channels even if they borrow formally. On the other hand, the study of Rogg 
(2000) analyzed data of three countries (Ecuador, El Salvador and Paraguay) and found 
out that access to credit encourage borrowers to save in formal accounts with positive 
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return instead of saving in livestock, jewelry or assets. The author explained these results 
by suggesting that poor borrowers have increased confidence in the financial market 
which motivates them to open formal saving accounts.  
 
2.3. Saving by poor households in Egypt 
Microfinance services in Egypt are mostly microcredit services provided to the 
poor in order to start their business or scale-up an existing one. Microsaving products are 
provided in a limited scope by the post office since the legislations prohibit NGOs and 
MFIs from collecting saving deposits. By the same token, microinsurance is provided by 
few insurance companies (United Nations, 2008; Sanabel, 2010a).  
Microcredit started in Egypt in 1950's by lending agriculture loans through the 
governmental bank, Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PDRAC), 
followed by the Initiative of the Productive Families (Planet Finance, 2008). The industry 
began to actively and strongly operate when two main programs were initiated by the 
National Bank for Development (NBD) and Alexandria Business Association (ABA) 
followed by a several institutions (USAID, 2009).  
The channels that are mainly used to provide microcredit are banks supervised by 
the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) as well as more than 300 MFIs and NGOs (Sanabel, 
2010a). The banks include private banks like National Bank of Development and Bank of 
Alexandria as well as public ones, Banque Misr and Banque du Caire, Nasser Bank and 
PDRAC. One of the major stakeholders of the market in Egypt is the Social Fund for 
Development (SFD) founded in 1991 as a quasi-governmental institution to support 
Egyptian MFIs through loans, subsidies and technical assistance (USAID, 2009; CBE & 
SFD, 2005; Planet Finance, 2008). Table 1 summarizes some indicators of key players 
(Mix Market, 2015). 
Egypt is considered as the biggest microcredit market in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region in terms of outreach (Mix market, 2015). Also, the 
Egyptian market was ranked as the second in terms of productivity with an average of 
270 borrowers per loan officer. Nevertheless, there is a huge demand gap since Egypt 
21 
 
reaches only 5% of the potential clients who could achieve 20 million persons (United 
Nations, 2008).  
As for the lending methodologies, individual lending represents the biggest share 
of portfolio, yet group lending increased since 2009 which opposed the decline in MENA 
region (Sanabel, 2010a). Regarding the depth of outreach, it is measured through the 
percentage of women borrowers to total borrowers reached within the country and the 
average loan balance as a percentage of GNI per capita (Sanabel, 2010b). The depth of 
outreach has been increasing over the years due to the increased percentage of women 
borrowers that reached 67% in 2013 (Mix Market, 2015).  
Few impact surveys were conducted in Egypt to test the welfare effect of 
microcredit (Iqbal & Riad, 2004; Nader, 2007; Abou-Ali et al., 2009).The results of these 
surveys showed that microcredit increases income, food expenditures and reduces 
poverty rate. A national impact survey of microfinance was conducted on a sample of 
2,500 microfinance clients. The findings indicated that microcredit has a positive impact 
on welfare including asset ownership, consumption expenditure, quality and quantity of 
food as well as children education (Planet Finance, 2008). 
Despite this promising market of microcredit, microsaving products are offered 
only through few formal institutions like the post office. Given its high outreach (more 
than 3,600 branches and more than 13 million saving account holders) and low-cost 
process, national postal authority is considered as the main player in the market (Planet 
finance, 2008; United Nations, 2008). The postal services include saving books that 
require an opening balance of 10 EGP, investment books that starts from 100 EGP and 
golden accounts for larger amount starting from 10,000 EGP (USAID, 2009).  
Given that legislations prohibit NGOs and non-bank institutions from accepting 
savings while banks are reluctant to handle small savings due to high administrative cost, 
the majority of savings of this disadvantaged segment are informal (United Nations, 
2008; Sanabel, 2010b). The national impact survey showed that thirty-one percent of 
2,500 poor households save while 10% only had formal saving account. Thus, large 
amounts of saving are kept at home or saved through ROSCAs (Planet Finance, 2008).  
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Table 1 Indicators of key players in microcredit market (Egypt) 
MFI 
Loans 
(USD) 
Active 
Borrowers 
Assets 
(USD) 
Percentage 
of Female 
Borrowers 
Borrowers 
per staff 
member 
Number of 
outstanding 
loans 
 
ABA 60,929,049 234,371 87,460,638 53 % 195 234,371 
ABWA 5,281,522 16,527 5,282,173 92% 116 15,947 
Tadamun 7,216,805 60,451 16,249,144 100% 193 60,451 
ASBA 61,854,750 225,289 124,506,173 82% 116 225,289 
Banque du 
Caire 
35,347,222 93,516 2,121,766 
 
21% 123 225,000 
CEOSS 10,163,510 53,859 11,859,400 67% 273 53,859 
DBACD 32,048,776 117,950 43,796,606 53% 169 117,950 
ESED 16,300,861 70,640 29,467,808 71 % 118 70,640 
FMF 5,014,048 18,654 4,096,087 55% 89 15,673 
Future 1,419,373 10,451 1,531,921 100% 149 10,470 
Lead 
Foundation 
22,888,032 141,233 38,380,723 86% 174 141,233 
NSBA 667,285 5,055 2,121,807 80% 43 5,055 
RADE 2,248,960 12,735 3,213,942 89% 137 13356 
SBACD 12,241,449 24,603 18,173,640 44% 53 30923 
SCDA 784,561 1,951 1,112,002 47% 78 1,951 
Source: Mix Market (2015) 
 
ROSCAs are perceived to be the best form of saving that covers marriage cost or 
health emergencies. It is worthy to mention that women prefer ROSCAs and cash at 
home, while men prefer saving in bank or post office accounts. This highlighted the need 
for gender sensitive saving products that combine informal and formal features (Planet 
Finance, 2008). 
 
2.4. Conclusion  
This chapter highlighted different motives of household saving and discussed key 
theories explaining household’s saving behavior. Income, income fluctuation, uncertainty 
and age are main determinants of saving. Additional determinants included family size, 
dependency ratio, gender, occupation and education. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on 
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determinants of poor household saving in developing countries is mixed. This suggests 
potential limitations of traditional saving theories in developing countries. Furthermore, 
there is little evidence on the determinants of informal saving and whether they are 
similar to formal saving even though informal saving is the most common form of saving 
in developing countries.  
Microfinance emerged in developing countries where households face frequent 
income shocks and high liquidity constraints due to the absence of well developed 
markets. Microfinance started by lending microcredit to the poor in order to establish 
income generating activities then it was expanded to microinsurance and microsaving. 
Early evidence on the impact of microcredit on household well being was positive. 
Nevertheless, when recent rigorous methodologies were employed and selection bias was 
corrected, weak evidence on the significant effect of microcredit was found.  
This controversy about the impact of microcredit paved the way to introduce 
formal saving products. Microsaving products mobilize small frequent savings of poor 
households to protect them against emergencies and finance their investment or life-cycle 
events. The literature indicated potential positive impact on welfare of low income 
households in developing countries. 
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Chapter Three: Research problem 
 
There is inconclusive evidence on the determinants of poor household’s saving. Thus, 
there is a need to understand the saving behavior of poor households in developing 
countries which is the main purpose of this study. Additionally, the determinants of 
informal saving in developing countries are rarely tackled in the literature. Likewise, the 
synergy between access to credit and saving of poor households need to be further 
explored. The potential negative effect of access to credit needs to be taken into 
consideration while designing and evaluating microfinance programs. However, the 
literature focused on the impact of microcredit or microsaving while giving little attention 
to the interaction between credit and saving.  
 
3.1. Research objectives 
This paper will tackle the previously mentioned gap in the literature by attempting 
to understand the saving behavior of poor households in Egypt and determining the 
factors that affect saving. Moreover, this study will contribute to understanding the 
determinants of different forms of saving, formal and informal. Also, the study will test 
the impact of access to credit on the saving behavior of poor households. Linking saving 
to credit can highlight new way of designing and evaluating the impact of microfinance 
programs. This will be contrasted to the case of credit constrained to explore the effect of 
liquidity constraint on saving behavior.  
 
3.2. Research questions 
 
1. What factors affect the decision of Egyptian poor households to save? 
2. How does access to credit affect saving behavior of poor households? 
3. How different are the determinants of informal saving compared to formal saving? 
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3.3. Significance of the study 
Answering these questions will contribute to the literature on saving in 
developing countries. Differentiating between informal and formal saving is a 
contribution of this study. As indicated by Karlan and Morduch (2009) focusing on one 
channel or the overall saving could result in concluding that saving is increasing while in 
fact one type of saving could be increasing at the expense of the other type. Moreover, 
understanding key determinants of saving will guide financial institutions in designing 
tailored saving products that meet the needs of poor households. The current study will 
also contribute to better understanding the micro factors influencing saving in Egypt 
which will affect the policies that target poor households. 
According to the recent figures of 2013, 26.3% of the population is living below 
the national poverty line since their monthly income is less than 325 EGP. Almost half of 
these poor live in rural areas (CAPMAS, 2014). Poor households often have rescue to 
informal saving since they can not access formal institutions that are unwilling to deal 
with small savings. From the recent figures about the potential demand of microfinance, 
the Egyptian market is a fertile ground for formal microsaving. Understanding the saving 
behavior of poor households in Egypt and the synergy between credit and saving is the 
first step required to design better saving products that target the large pool of poor in 
Egypt.  
If the availability of microsaving products increased in Egypt, large amount of 
savings will be mobilized for investment. Finally, financial institutions dealing with poor 
households need to decide about combining credit and saving products or operating based 
on ‘saving-first’ approach. This approach builds a good base of clients with saving 
history then provides them with credit instead of the current ‘credit-first’ approach.  
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
4.1 Model specification  
Including saving as the dependent variable is more suitable for understanding the 
determinants of saving since the analysis of saving behavior is often based on household 
decision (Jongwanich, 2010). In order to answer the first and second research questions, 
the following probit model in equation 3 will be used: 
 
  𝑷𝒓 (𝑺𝒊𝒋 = 𝒓) = 𝑭(𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑹𝑬𝑫𝑰𝑻𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑯𝒋 + 𝜷𝟒𝑬𝑴𝑬𝑹𝑮𝒋 + 𝜷𝟓𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑼𝒋)        (3) 
 
𝐒𝐢𝐣: binary variable as r takes the value of 1 if individual i in household j is saving and 0 
otherwise. A key advantage of this binary variable is that it does not suffer from 
measurement error and underestimation of saving rate witnessed in developing countries 
(Deaton, 1997).  
In order to explore the factors affecting the decision of poor households to save, 
the below exogenous variables are included in the model: 
𝐂𝐑𝐄𝐃𝐈𝐓𝐢: this variable reflects access to formal credit. It takes the value of 1 if the 
individual, aged 15 years and above, had access to credit during the past year and 0 if 
individual did not have access to credit or applied for a loan but the application was 
rejected due to insufficient collateral (credit-constrained). The parameter of this variable 
will capture the effect of access to credit on the probability of saving which is the second 
research question of this study.  
𝐗𝐢: vector of socio-economic characteristics of individual i: 
𝐄𝐃𝐔𝐂𝐢: educational level of individuals whose age is ten years and above. 
Educational variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent is educated (read and 
write, less than intermediate, intermediate, above intermediate and holding 
university degree) and 0 if the respondent is illiterate.  
𝐄𝐌𝐏𝐋𝐎𝐘𝐢 : denotes the employment status during the last three months. It ranges 
from being employed, unemployed and out of labor force.  
𝐀𝐆𝐄𝐢: age of individual to captures life-cycle effect. 
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𝐒𝐐𝐀𝐆𝐄𝐢: age squared of individual. 
𝐌𝐀𝐑𝐑𝐈𝐄𝐃𝐢: the marital status of individual is determined by whether the 
respondent is single (including being divorced, widow and engaged) or married. 
𝐔𝐍𝐂𝐄𝐑𝐢: proxy of income uncertainty of individual. This variable reflects the 
degree of uncertainty of future income. There is high uncertainty if the respondent 
suffers from disability, longstanding illness or chronic diseases and if there low 
employment stability (temporary, seasonal and casual). 
𝐆𝐄𝐍𝐃𝐄𝐑𝐢: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is female and 
0 otherwise. 
𝐇𝐣: vector of household characteristics: 
𝐑𝐔𝐑𝐀𝐋𝐣: proxy of geographical location that takes the value of 1 if the household 
is located in rural area and 0 if in urban area.  
 𝐇𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄𝐣: household size which measures the number of person living at the 
household. 
𝐒𝐏𝐄𝐂𝐈𝐀𝐋𝐣: a variable that reflects the occurrence of special events in household j 
such as wedding, engagement, births, feasts and ceremonies. 
𝐐𝐏𝐎𝐎𝐑𝐄𝐒𝐓𝐣: this variable is added as a proxy of the wealth status of households. 
It controls for the quintile of wealth that ranges from 1 (poorest) to 5 (richest). 
Quintiles of wealth were calculated in the dataset based on wealth score determined 
by a number of factors including: number of rooms, total area and material of house 
as well as assets ownership (fridge, freezer, dishwasher, TV, satellite, video, radio, 
air conditioner, microwave, cooker, fan, heater, camera, car, bicycle, scooter, 
computer, cellphone, wireless router). If the household pertains to the poorest 
quintile, this variable will take the value of 1 and 0 otherwise.  
𝐄𝐌𝐄𝐑𝐆𝐣: measures the occurrence of emergency in household j like deaths and health 
shocks. 
𝐈𝐍𝐒𝐔𝐣: indicates whether any individual in household j is covered by health insurance 
(private, employment, syndicate or university). 
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Additionally, the sample is divided into poor individuals (quintiles 1 and 2) and 
rich individuals (quintiles 4 and 5) to explore whether the determinants of saving will 
differ among quintiles. Equation 3 is used but to look at the effect income within poor 
and rich quintiles, equation 3 is modified by substituting 𝐐𝐏𝐎𝐎𝐑𝐄𝐒𝐓𝐣 by the variable: 
𝐈𝐍𝐂𝐎𝐌𝐄𝐢: the level of monthly income of individual i. This variable adds basic wage 
from primary and secondary job (if applicable), remittances, donations (cash and 
monetary value of in-kind assistance), pensions, social assistance form religious or non-
governmental institutions as well as returns on land and buildings.  
In order to address the third research question, equation 4 is used to differentiate 
between determinants of informal and formal saving, the model will be also estimated as 
below:   
 
𝐏𝐫 (𝐒𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐎𝐑𝐢𝐣 = 𝒓) = 𝐅(𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏𝐂𝐑𝐄𝐃𝐈𝐓𝐢 + 𝛃𝟐𝐗𝐢 + 𝛃𝟑𝐇𝐣 + 𝛃𝟒𝐄𝐌𝐄𝐑𝐆𝐣 + 𝛃𝟓𝐈𝐍𝐒𝐔𝐣)    (4) 
 
𝐒𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐎𝐑𝐢𝐣 : the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the individual saves informally 
(e.g. cash at home, gold, jewelry, livestock and ROSCA). Additionally, the model will be 
estimated including formal saving (𝐒𝐅𝐎𝐑𝐢𝐣) as a binary dependent variable that takes the 
value of 1 in case of saving in formal channels (e.g. post office, Nasser Social Bank, 
private and public banks). 
Probit regression will be applied to estimate coefficients using the method of 
maximum likelihood. By maximizing the log likelihood function, efficient and consistent 
estimates will be obtained from the probit model that assumes that disturbances follow 
the standard normal distribution. Thus, parameters will measure the effect of exogenous 
variables on the probability that households save (Pr(𝑆𝑖) = 1). This estimation method 
was selected given that the model has a binary dependent variable which should be 
estimated using non-linear regression methods like probit regression (Stock & Watson, 
2010).  
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4.2 Data 
The analysis of the present study is based on micro level data of the Egypt Labor 
Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) that was carried out in 2012 by the Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). ELMPS 2012 represents the third round 
of the longitudinal panel survey that was conducted in 1998 and 2006. It worth 
mentioning that the wealth score previously mentioned was calculated in the dataset and 
sample weights were added to ensure that the sample of ELMPS is representative of the 
population (Assaad & Krafft, 2013). 
Using two-stage stratified random sample, the survey interviewed a final sample 
of 12,060 households including 49,186 individuals. The previous rounds of the survey 
collected data about the background of parents, education, employment, unemployment, 
job characteristics, geographic mobility, earnings, fertility and women’s status. ELMPS 
2012 added questions about life events, marriage, migration, health, information 
technology, saving and borrowing.  
Since the section of saving and borrowing was added recently to the 
questionnaire, the cross-sectional round of 2012 is the only round used in the current 
paper. This section is addressed to those who are above 15 years old including 32,626 
individuals. Cross-sectional data is more suitable for testing the saving behavior as it 
takes into consideration different household characteristics like age, occupation and 
wealth (Suruga & Tachibanaki, 1991). The fieldwork of ELMPS 2012 took place from 
March to June 2012. The survey was carried out by 39 teams in addition to two teams 
that were responsible for quality control (Assaad & Krafft, 2013).  
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Chapter Five: Descriptive statistics 
The first section of this chapter presents the demographic characteristics of the sample 
while the second section discusses the saving and borrowing behavior of respondents.  
 
5.1. Demographic characteristics 
Out of the sample of this study, 56% live in rural areas. Those who live in Cairo 
and Alexandria account for 19% of the sample while 42% live in Upper Egypt and 39% 
live in Lower Egypt. As for gender, 50% of the respondents are female. The summary 
statistics of key variables are presented in table 2. The median age of respondents is 26 
years. This indicates that there might be a high potential for saving in this economic 
active age according to life cycle hypothesis. On average the household is composed of 5 
persons while some families have up to 21 persons, mainly in rural areas. Other 
descriptive statistics about education and marital status are presented in the appendix 
(table A and table B respectively). 
 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Age (years) 49,186 26 19 0 106 
Household size 
(persons) 
49,186 5 2 1 21 
Formal Loan (EGP) 876 14,320 18530 180 >100000 
Size of Installment 
(EGP) 
876 7,110 24047 10 >100000 
Informal Loan (EGP) 1,165 6,292 12985 10 >100000 
No of ROSCAs  1,766 1.11 0.47 1 5 
Size of ROSCA (EGP) 1,766 330 539 1 12,000 
No of members of 
ROSCA 
1,766 14 7 2 90 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
31 
 
Regarding the employment status of respondents, 53% of them are out of labor 
force, 43% were employed during the last 3 months and 4% are unemployed. Out of the 
employed respondents, 75% had permanent jobs while 25% had temporary and seasonal 
jobs. Moreover, the main economic activities are agriculture (30%) followed by trade 
(13%) and manufacturing (11%). Those who are working in the private sector account for 
75% of the sample while 25% work in government or public institutions.  
A closer look at the demographic characteristics by wealth quintiles indicates that 
poor quintiles are living in rural areas while richest quintiles live mostly in urban areas 
(figure 2). Furthermore, there is a large discrepancy in educational attainment that varies 
from the ability to read and write for the lowest quintile to the above intermediate level 
for the highest quintile (table 3). The low income earned by poor quintiles could be 
partially explained by the lack of decent of jobs that provide satisfactory income. Within 
the lowest quintile, 30% of those who worked during the past 3 months had casual jobs 
compared to 3% of highest quintile. Also, 13% of lowest quintile had work related 
insurance as opposed to 64% of highest quintile.  
 
 
Figure 2 Distribution of wealth quintile by region 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 3 Summary statistics by quintile (mean values) 
Variable Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Age (years) 27 25 25 25 28 
Educ (categories) 2 3 3 4 5 
Household size 
(persons) 
5 5 5 4 4 
Monthly 
Income (EGP) 
979 1,056 1,204 1,482 7,119 
Formal Loan (EGP) 8,809 10,459 13,304 16,025 25,086 
Size of Installment 
(EGP) 
7,843 5,925 4,633 8,796 8,811 
Informal Loan (EGP) 4,891 5,888 5,322 6,908 10,562 
No of ROSCAs  1.16 1.13 1.11 1.08 1.12 
Size of ROSCA (EGP) 213 217 259 318 475 
No of members of 
ROSCA 
14 14 14 14 14 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
5.2. Saving and borrowing 
Questions about saving and borrowing were addressed to individuals who are 
above 15 years (32,626 individuals). The analysis indicated that 29% of them are saving 
(9,357 individuals). Wealthier households have higher tendency to save, 51% of savers 
were women while 69% of those who save were living in urban areas. As for educational 
level, 38% of savers were university graduates followed by 31% who attained 
intermediate education, 12% less than intermediate, 11% illiterate, 5% above 
intermediate and 3% who can read and write. 
ROSCAs, gold and cash at home are the most common forms of saving followed 
by public banks and the post office (figure 3). A closer look at saving forms by wealth 
quintiles shows that lower quintiles tend to save informally while their formal saving is 
concentrated in the post office. As households gets richer, informal saving decreases in 
the favor of formal accounts in public and private banks (figure 4).  
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 indicate the percentage of formal versus informal saving by 
gender and region respectively. Males have higher tendency to save formally in public 
banks and the post office while females save more informally (ROSCAs, gold and cash). 
In urban areas, households prefer to save in public banks followed by gold and post office 
while in rural areas cash at home is followed by gold and post office. The analysis 
indicated that the top motives of participating in ROSCAs with friends, family or work 
colleagues are debt repayment (28%), marriage (16%) and house renewal (13%).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Percentage of different forms of saving 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4 Percentage of different forms of saving by quintile 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Figure 5 Percentage of saving forms by gender 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 6 Percentage of saving forms by region 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
As for borrowing, 4% of those who are above 15 years old borrowed informally 
during the past 12 months (1,300 individuals) compared to 2% who borrowed formally 
(650 individuals). Similar to saving, informal borrowing is more common among poor 
households who face liquidity constraints due to lack of collateral (Figure 7). For 
instance, 24% of rejected applicants of formal loans due to insufficient collateral were 
households of lowest quintile as opposed to 19% of highest quintile. Also, the average 
loan size, either formally or informally, increases as the mean income increases (table 3). 
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borrowing by gender and region respectively. In contrast to saving, males and females as 
well as individuals in urban and rural areas borrow more informally compared to formal 
loans. This could be due to the interest rate charged on formal loans since 92% of those 
who borrowed informally indicated that they did not pay interest or fees on these loans 
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include high cost of living followed by medical emergency which shows that informal 
borrowing is mostly used to finance consumption of households.  
On the other hand, public banks are the most common source of formal loans, 
followed by agriculture credit bank, Nasser Social Bank, NGOs and private banks. 
Agriculture credit bank, public sector banks and NGOs are the top borrowing sources for 
the lowest quintile while highest quintile borrow mostly from public and private banks. 
Reasons for formal borrowing differ from informal borrowing since the top reasons of 
formal loans include marriage followed by debt repayment and funding an enterprise; 
which justifies the large average size of formal loans compared to informal loans. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Percentage of different forms of borrowing by quintile 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 8 Percentage of borrowing forms by gender 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Figure 9 Percentage of borrowing forms by region 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Chapter Six: Estimation results  
This chapter presents the results of the probit regression used to investigate the factors 
affecting the saving behavior of poor households. The first section of this chapter 
discusses the impact of access to credit on saving followed by the impact of individual 
characteristics in the second section. The impact of household characteristics and health 
shocks will be discussed in the third and fourth sections respectively. Afterwards, 
robustness tests will be presented. 
 
6.1. Borrowing 
The maximum likelihood and marginal effect estimates of the aforementioned 
probit model (equation 3) are presented in table 4. Results suggest that access to credit 
increases the probability of saving at 5% significance level by 3% on average. This 
positive coefficient supports the empirical studies of Barnes, Keogh and Nemarundwe 
(2001) in Uganda as well as Barnes, Gaile and Kibombo (2001) in Zimbabwe.  
In order to explore the effect of borrowing on different types of saving, the log 
likelihood function of informal saving (SiINFOR) and formal saving (SiFOR) were 
maximized to estimate the parameters of equation 4 (table 4). The results suggest that 
credit increases informal saving at 5% significance level while it has an insignificant 
effect on formal saving. A closer look at this coefficient by wealth quintile will point out 
that this result is robust to poor quintiles (table 5). On the other hand, credit increases 
informal and formal saving significantly among rich quintiles (table 6). It is worthy to 
note that the effect of credit is higher for the rich since credit increases the probability of 
saving by 3% compared to 1% for the poor.   
These findings suggest that while access to formal credit motivates rich quintiles 
to save more informally and formally, the poor prefer to keep their informal arrangements 
of saving even if they are borrowing from formal institutions like MFIs or banks. This 
implies that there is little evidence on the crowd-out effect which is similar to the 
findings of Aportela (1999) and Barnes et al. (2001). A potential explanation could be 
that poor borrowers in Egypt have not reach the desired level of confidence in the 
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financial market that motivates them to have formal saving accounts. Another potential 
reason might be that the poor prefer to save away from the formal financial institutions to 
avoid using these savings for repaying the installments of the loan or covering defaults.  
 
Table 4: Regression estimates (All Quintiles) 
 
Dependent variable: 
 𝐒𝐢 
Dependent variable: 
 𝐒𝐢𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐎𝐑 
Dependent variable: 
𝐒𝐢𝐅𝐎𝐑 
 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
CREDIT      0.156 
  (0.020)** 
0.027 
 
      0.185 
(0.010)** 
0.030 -0.052 
(0.655) 
-0.003 
Individual characteristics      
EDUC 
    0.341 
 (0.000)*** 
0.060      0.242 
(0.000)*** 
0.035 0.643 
 (0.000)*** 
0.036 
EMPLOY 
    0.298 
(0.000)*** 
0.052       0.316 
(0.000)*** 
0.046 0.140 
(0.038)** 
0.007 
AGE 
0.088 
(0.000)*** 
0.0154      0.093 
   (0.000)*** 
0.135 0.0646 
(0.000)*** 
0.003 
SQAGE 
   -0.0009 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0002      -0.001 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0001 -0.0004 
(0.006)** 
-0.002 
MARRIED 
   0.0077 
(0.032)** 
0. 001      0.110 
(0.007)** 
0.016 -0.315 
(0.001)*** 
-0.017 
UNCER 
  0.024 
 (0.046)** 
0.004       0.075 
(0.018)** 
0.011 0. 135 
 (0.015)** 
0.007 
GENDER 
   0.243 
(0.000)*** 
0.036      0.318 
(0.000)*** 
0.050 -0.187 
(0.001)*** 
-0.010 
Household characteristics      
RURAL 
  -0.105 
(0.000)*** 
-0.018       -0.053 
(0.080)* 
-0.007 -0.228 
   (0.000)*** 
-0.012 
HSIZE 
  -0.065 
(0.000)*** 
-0.011      -0.059 
 (0.000)*** 
-0.008 -0.056 
  (0.000)*** 
-0.003 
SPECIAL 
  0.182 
(0.000)*** 
0.031       0.180 
 (0.000)*** 
0.026 0.112 
(0.137) 
0.006 
QPOOREST 
 -0.422 
(0.000)*** 
-0.074      -0.365 
   (0.000)*** 
-0.052       -0.547 
  (0.000)*** 
-0.031 
Health Emergency      
EMERG 
  0.114 
 (0.212) 
0.019 -0.003 
(0.097)* 
-0.0005 0.267 
(0.490) 
0.0142 
INSU 
  0.221 
(0.000)*** 
0.038 0.216 
     (0.000)*** 
0.032 0.137 
(0.008)** 
0.007 
n= 29,766  28,967  27,325  
BIC    6,491  14,906  5,600  
        Figures in parentheses indicate P-value>z 
       *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
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Table 5: Regression estimates (Poor Quintiles) 
 
Dependent variable: 
 𝐒𝐢 
Dependent variable: 
 𝐒𝐢𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐎𝐑 
Dependent variable: 
𝐒𝐢𝐅𝐎𝐑 
 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
CREDIT  0.123  
(0.021)** 
0.012       0.160 
(0.011)** 
0.014 -0.032 
(0.909) 
-0.005 
Individual characteristics      
EDUC 
0.152 
(0.016)** 
0.015 -0.114 
(0.078)* 
-0.010 0.315 
(0.030)** 
0.005 
EMPLOY 
0.299 
(0.000)*** 
0.302 0.318 
(0.000)*** 
0.028 0.059 
(0.068)** 
0.009 
AGE 
0.063 
(0.000)*** 
0.006 0.082 
(0.000)*** 
0.007 -0.032 
(0.022)** 
-0.0005 
SQAGE 
-0.0007 
(0.039)** 
-0.0007 -0.001 
(0.037)** 
-0.0009 0.0006 
(0.087)* 
0.941 
MARRIED 
0.157 
(0. 816) 
0.001 -0.004 
(0.943) 
-0.0004 -0.045 
(0.731) 
-0.0007 
UNCER 
0.051 
(0.015)** 
0.005 0.075 
(0.197)** 
0.068 -0.114 
(0.376) 
-0.001 
GENDER 
0.180 
(0.007)** 
0.018 0.238 
(0.000)*** 
0.022 -0.202 
(0.017)** 
-0.003 
INCOME 
0.00013 
(0.245) 
0.0001 0.0001 
(0.369) 
0.0009 0.0001 
(0.104) 
0.305 
Household characteristics      
RURAL 
-0.026 
(0.093)* 
-0.002 0.032 
(0.061)* 
0.002 -0.002 
(0.099)* 
-0.430 
HSIZE 
-0.088 
(0.000)*** 
-0.008 -0.082 
(0.000)*** 
-0.007 -0.092 
(0.002)** 
-0.001 
SPECIAL 
0.108 
(0.268) 
0.011 0.109 
(0.029)** 
0.009 0.088 
(0.966) 
0.0001 
Health Emergency      
EMERG 
-0.019 
(0.092)* 
-0.001 -0.037 
(0.086)* 
-0.003 -0.218 
(0.464) 
-0.003 
INSU 
0.180 
(0.005)** 
0.018 0.171 
(0.010)** 
0.015 0.106 
(0.043)** 
0.002 
n= 11,652  11,577  11,146  
BIC    2,590  4,220  916  
        Figures in parentheses indicate P-value>z 
       *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6: Regression estimates (Rich Quintiles) 
 
Dependent variable: 
 𝐒𝐢 
Dependent variable: 
 𝐒𝐢𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐎𝐑 
Dependent variable: 
𝐒𝐢𝐅𝐎𝐑 
 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
Max. 
Likelihood 
Marginal 
Effect 
CREDIT  0.112  
(0.025)** 
0.028       0.151 
(0.017)** 
0.031 0.188 
(0.023)** 
-0.201 
Individual characteristics      
EDUC 
0.381 
(0.000)*** 
0.095 0.176 
(0.032)** 
0.036 0.958 
(0.000)*** 
0.102 
EMPLOY 
0.274 
(0.000)*** 
0.068 0.307 
(0.000)*** 
0.063 0.137 
(0.011)** 
0.014 
AGE 
0.106 
(0.000)*** 
0.026 0.107 
(0.000)*** 
0.022 0.083 
(0.000)*** 
0.008 
SQAGE 
-0.001 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0002 -0.001 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0002 -0.0006 
(0.003)** 
-0.0007 
MARRIED 
0.131 
(0.796) 
0.003 0.224 
(0.000)*** 
0.045 -0.404 
(0.000)*** 
-0.043 
UNCER 
0.010 
(0.816) 
0.002 0.042 
(0.369) 
0.008 0.127 
(0.081)* 
0.013 
GENDER 
0.203 
(0.000)*** 
0.050 0.368 
(0.000)*** 
0.075 -0.217 
(0.002)** 
-0.023 
INCOME 
0.001 
(0.051)** 
0.0003 -0.001 
(0.089)* 
-0.0002 0.0008 
(0.011)** 
0.00008 
Household characteristics      
RURAL 
-0.071 
(0.079)*** 
-0.017 -0.017 
(0.069)* 
-0.003 -0.207 
(0.003)** 
-0.022 
HSIZE 
-0.069 
(0.000)*** 
-0.017 -0.057 
(0.000)*** 
-0.011 -0.058 
(0.001)** 
-0.006 
SPECIAL 
0.156 
(0.005)** 
0.039 0.142 
(0.019)** 
0.029 0.144 
(0.113) 
0.015 
Health Emergency      
EMERG 
0.143 
(0.241) 
0.035 -0.021 
(0.877) 
-0.004 0.316 
(0.420) 
0.033 
INSU 
0.184 
(0.000)*** 
0.046 0.178 
(0.000)*** 
0.036 0.112 
(0.087)* 
0.012 
n= 11,392  10,602  9,811  
BIC    2,433  7,706  3,857  
        Figures in parentheses indicate P-value>z 
       *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
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6.2. Individual characteristics  
Education increases the probability of saving informally and formally at 1% 
significance level. However, this result differs among the poor since being educated 
decreases the probability of informal saving in favor of formal saving at 1% significance 
level. This could be due to increased awareness of formal saving. This result contradicts 
with the findings of Burney and Khan (1992), Rehman et al. (2011) and Kahn (2013) 
who found that high educational level has a negative effect on the saving behavior due to 
lower risk aversion and the high cost children education as previously mentioned in the 
literature review.  
Employed individuals have a higher tendency to save informally and formally. 
This result is robust to the sub-sample of rich and poor. The positive significant 
coefficient of age and the negative coefficient of age squared shows that there is an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between age and probability of saving. In other words, the 
probability of saving increases as age increases but with a decreasing rate. This result is 
robust to formal and informal saving among rich quintiles. However, for poor households 
it is robust only to informal saving since the coefficients of formal saving indicate little 
evidence on life-cycle hypothesis. This finding supports the work of Deaton (1989) 
suggesting limited application of life-cycle hypothesis among the poor in developing 
countries as previously discussed in the literature. 
Being married is a factor that contributes positively to informal saving at the 
expense of formal saving. This result is robust only to rich individuals. The positive 
coefficient of uncertainty supports the existence of precautionary saving among the 
sample in line with the studies of Skinner (1987), Deaton (1989), Kazarosian (1997) as 
well as Carroll and Samwick (1998) who suggested that saving in developing countries 
better fits precautionary saving instead of saving for retirement or bequest. A detailed 
look at the parameter of uncertainty among wealth quintiles will show that poor 
households tend to save more informally as income uncertainty increases while rich 
households save more formally. 
Females have higher probability of saving at 1% significance level compared to 
males. By looking at types of saving, results indicate that females tend to save more 
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informally then formally. This tendency is noticed among poor and rich individuals. This 
result contradicts with the findings of the literature reporting lower savings among 
females (Ahmad & Asghar, 2004; Kibet et al., 2009; Abdelkhalek et al., 2010). The 
variable of income is introduced among poor and rich quintiles. Results show that higher 
income reduces informal saving in the favor of formal saving among rich individuals.  
 
6.3. Household characteristics 
The marginal effect estimates pointed out that living in rural areas decreases the 
probability of saving by 2 % on average. For poor households, living in rural areas 
contributes to increasing informal saving at the expense of formal saving. Larger families 
tend to save less informally and formally. This negative effect among all quintiles could 
be attributed to increased expenditures of larger families in line with the results of Ahmad 
and Asghar (2004), Oberta (2006) in Pakistan as well as AbdelKhalek et al. (2010) in 
Morocco. An additional reason could be the intergenerational link that reduces the 
motivation to save for retirement in developing countries as explained by Deaton (1992) 
and supported empirically by Kelly and Williamson (1968), Musgrove (1979) and 
Gersovitz (1998). 
Special events increase the probability of saving prior to the event by 3% on 
average at 1% significance level. Nevertheless, this result is significant only for informal 
saving among poor and rich households. Finally, the probability of saving increases 
among wealthy households since pertaining to the poorest quintile reduces the probability 
of overall saving by 7% on average, informal saving by 5% and formal saving by 3% at 
1% significance level respectively.  
 
6.4. Health shocks  
Health emergency significantly reduces the probability of informal saving among 
poor households while it has an insignificant effect on rich quintiles. This result indicates 
that health emergency does not have the same burden on poor and rich quintiles since 
poor households have higher tendency to use their informal savings as Out Of Pocket 
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(OOP) expenditures to finance health shocks. These results could be justified by the 
absence of effective health insurance since 81% of poor quintiles indicated that they do 
not have any health insurance as opposed to 56% of the rich quintiles. In order to further 
explore the effect of health insurance on the probability of saving, the variable of 
insurance was included. Its positive significant coefficient shows that health insurance 
protects households against emergencies and reduces the use of savings as OOP 
expenditures on health (Wagstaff & Pradhan, 2005).  
 
6.5. Robustness tests 
Wald test indicated that the previously discussed coefficients are significantly 
different from zero at 𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.000. Additionally, the correlation matrix 
showed that there is no multicollinearity between explanatory variables (table C in the 
appendix). However, the negative correlation between employment and being a female 
reaches -0.492.  
Furthermore, Ramsey test was conducted to test the specification of the model 
and whether there is omitted variable bias. The findings showed that the null hypothesis, 
model has no omitted variables, is not rejected. Also, the previously reported results are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. The tables reported Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
that could be used to compare between the different models since a lower BIC indicates 
better-fitting model. For instance, BIC shows that the model better fits poor quintiles 
compared to rich quintiles when informal and formal saving are the dependent variables.  
In order to further explore the robustness of credit to different model 
specifications, saving was regressed only on credit and individual characteristics without 
gender then the latter was added to explore the gender effect. Likewise, saving was 
regressed on credit and household characteristics as well as credit and health shocks. This 
test was also conducted for informal and formal saving separately as well as poor and 
rich quintiles.  
The maximum likelihood estimates and their significance level indicate that credit 
is robust to different model specifications among poor and rich quintiles. Moreover, the 
significance of the parameter of credit increases when household characteristics are 
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included compared to individual characteristics which might suggest that household 
characteristics like living in rural areas, family size and having a special event enforce the 
effect of credit on the probability of saving informally and formally (from table D to table 
G in the appendix).  It worth mentioning that when the variable QPOOREST is included 
in the regression of formal saving, the positive maximum likelihood estimate of special 
events becomes insignificant (table F in the appendix).  
The gender effect is a remarkable factor that turns the coefficient of credit from 
insignificant to significant when the dependent variable is the overall saving (table D in 
the appendix). Moreover, when regressing informal saving on individual characteristics 
including gender, the significance of the parameter of uncertainty increases which shows 
that informal precautionary saving is more evident among females (table E in the 
appendix). 
 Another interesting finding about gender is noticed regarding the informal saving 
behavior of the poor since adding the variable of gender turns the positive parameter of 
credit from insignificance to 10% significance level. This finding implies that the positive 
impact of providing access to credit on the probability of informal saving is enforced by 
being a poor female. Furthermore, the significance of the parameter of education 
increases from 10% to 1% significance level showing stronger effect of educating poor 
females on the probability of saving informally (table G in the appendix). 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion and policy implications 
The descriptive statistics highlighted that the top channels of saving among the 
sample were informal (ROSCAs, gold and cash at home). They were followed by formal 
saving at public banks and post office. These informal mechanisms were common among 
females and rural households. Moreover, poor households tend to save more informally 
while their formal saving is concentrated in the post office. As households gets richer, 
informal saving decreases in the favor of formal accounts in public and private banks.  
By the same token informal borrowing is more common among poor households 
who face liquidity constraints due to lack of collateral. Also, informal borrowing could be 
preferred due to the interest rate charged on formal loans since 92% of those who 
borrowed informally indicated that they did not pay interest or fees on these loans 
compared to 2% of those who borrowed from formal sources. 
The results of regression suggest that the determinants of informal and formal 
saving are quite different. This is a contribution of this study since analyzing the overall 
saving could lead to wrong conclusions about the impact of credit and the determinants of 
saving. For instance, access to credit significantly increases the probability of saving 
among the poor. However, by looking at the different types of saving, it is indicated that 
credit increases informal saving while it has an insignificant effect on formal saving. On 
the contrary, it increases both formal and informal saving of rich households. These 
findings imply that the poor prefer to save informally even if they are interacting with 
formal institutions to borrow money. This could be due to the low level of confidence in 
the formal financial market in Egypt or fear of using savings to cover loan installments.   
The saving behavior of poor households is positively affected by individual 
characteristics like employment and education that decreases the probability of informal 
saving in favor of formal saving. A potential explanation could be the increased 
awareness of formal saving among educated persons. Also, females have higher 
probability to save, yet they are saving more informally. Robustness tests indicate that 
including the variable of gender enforce the positive effect of access to credit, education 
and income uncertainty on informal saving. On the other hand, pertaining to the poorest 
quintile will significantly reduce the probability of saving.  
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Among poor households, evidence on life-cycle hypothesis was robust only to 
informal saving. On the other hand, the theory of precautionary saving was supported 
since poor households tend to save more informally as income uncertainty increases 
while rich households save more formally. These findings are in line with the work of 
Deaton (1989) who suggested limited application of some saving theories in developing 
countries. He argued that saving in developing countries better fits precautionary saving 
instead of saving for retirement or bequest due to the different demographic structure and 
higher credit constraints compared to developed countries.  
Regarding household characteristics, rural households and large families have 
lower probability to save. Also, saving prior to special events, like weddings, feasts, 
ceremonies and births, is robust only to informal saving. Health emergencies have a 
significant negative effect on the informal saving of poor households who do not have 
access to health insurance compared to wealthy households. It worth mentioning that the 
previously mentioned household characteristics enforce the effect of credit on the 
probability of saving more than individual characteristics. This finding suggests that 
financial institutions could rely on household characteristics to market their saving 
products and increase their outreach.  
The previously discussed findings indicate that the poor in Egypt can and do save, 
yet they keep their savings in informal channels. Therefore, policies in Egypt should 
improve access to formal financial services and aim at building an inclusive financial 
system. The research of Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) (2006) 
reviewed cases from Benin, Bosnia, Mexico, the Philippines and Uganda in order to 
identify the necessary policies to increase the outreach of formal saving services among 
the poor. The institutional policies included improving proximity of formal institutions 
since distance act as a barrier for poor households. This could be done by increasing the 
outreach of post offices, rural banks and introducing deposit collectors that succeeded in 
some countries like Indonesia and Sri Lanka in order to overcome the geographic 
concentration of financial institutions.  
Furthermore, the transaction cost of accessing saving accounts could be reduced 
by accepting small balances and low or zero opening fees. Additionally, simplification of 
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the procedures required to open an account or access credit is a key to attract poor clients 
(Musona & Coetezee, 2001; Hulme et al., 2009; Chowa, Masa, & Ansong, 2012). In 
summary, incentives for the poor to mobilize savings include convenience, liquidity and 
quick access to saving accounts in order to face unexpected events (CGAP, 1998). 
Successful cases of banks that improved their outreach in developing countries included 
the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand (BAAC), the Banco 
Caja Social in Colombia (BCS), the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) that reached a larger 
number of the poor by locating their field units near the poor as well as offering simple 
products that can be easily understood (CGAP, 1998).  
The use of technology, like smart cards and mobile phones, in order to introduce 
innovative saving products achieved promising results in different countries (Hulme et 
al., 2009). For instance, an initiative in Kenya by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), Vodafone and Commercial Bank of Africa aimed at improving 
access to formal financial products through a secured software that allow customers to 
make simple financial transactions using mobile phones. This initiative succeeded in 
attracting “geographically isolated populations” and reached nine million persons in three 
years (Pande et al., 2012).  
In contrast to the widespread notion about compulsory savings, which are savings 
linked to loans to enforce saving habits and teach the poor to save, they act as collateral if 
loans are not repaid which increase the insecurity of accessing these savings. On the other 
hand, voluntary savings assume that the poor save and they only need effective formal 
financial channels that meet their specific needs (CGAP, 1997; Hulme et al., 2009; 
Tiwari, Singh, & Wright, 2014). Researchers found that individual, secured, voluntary 
and easy to access savings are more successful in reaching the poor compared to group, 
forced and locked-in saving accounts (CGAP, 1998). Accordingly, financial institutions 
should focus their efforts on designing and promoting financial products tailored to the 
poor instead of teaching them to save (CGAP, 1997).  
Policies should also tackle a different aspect which is creating an enabling 
regulatory environment. In Egypt, MFIs and NGOs are not allowed to collect savings 
directly. In India, the same barrier was overcome by the “Business Correspond Model” 
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where MFIs collaborate with banks to offer microsaving products. This model succeeded 
in increasing financial inclusion and achieved higher outreach of poor clients (Tiwari et 
al., 2014). Therefore, since NGOs and MFIs in Egypt are considered as grassroots 
organizations, they can form strategic partnerships with banks to be able to tap the unmet 
needs and opportunities of the poor (Hulme et al., 2009). By the same token, potential 
partnerships with the post office should be considered as it is considered as a powerful 
formal saving tool for poor households in Egypt, particularly in rural areas.  
The aforementioned institutional and regulatory reforms that are concerned with 
the supply side should go hand in hand with improvements in the demand side. This 
could be achieved by overcoming cultural barriers that decrease the uptake of formal 
financial services. For instance, financial literacy programs, particularly among women 
and low educated persons, increase the knowledge and understanding of financial 
services (Mujeri, 2015). Successful examples include the Reserve Bank of India that 
launched in 2007 an initiative to improve financial literacy by establishing free credit 
counseling centers. Likewise, in Uganda, USAID in partnership with rural SPEED 
attempted to increase financial awareness through different campaigns in radio, outdoor 
advertisement and theatre shows that are easy to understand (Pande et al., 2012).  
In addition to the previously mentioned policies, the results of the current study 
indicate that females have higher tendency to save, yet they save more informally. This 
implies that there is a need to offer gender sensitive products tailored to the needs and 
constraints of women (Mujeri, 2015). These opportunities and challenges could be 
explored through gender-disaggregated data. Also, given that women have limited access 
over resources, they need increased direct access to financial services without husbands’ 
intervention (Fletschner & Kenney, 2011). Furthermore, there is a need to encourage 
agriculture banks to lend in rural areas and form cooperatives to encourage saving among 
the rural poor households. As suggested by the findings of this study, saving products 
could be linked to particular goals like special events or saving for health emergencies. 
Future researches could explore the saving behavior of rural population to identify 
the determinants of informal and formal saving among households living in rural areas. 
Land ownership and livestock are potential key variables that affect the saving behavior 
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of rural households. Future researches could also conduct experimental research and use 
game theory to investigate formal and informal saving in Egypt. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (10 YEARS AND ABOVE) 
Education Percent  
Illiterate 24  
Read & Write 10  
Less than Intermediate 23  
Intermediate 28  
Above Intermediate 3  
University and Above 12  
Total 100  
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
TABLE B: MARITAL STATUS 
Marital Percent  
Less than minimum age 38  
Never married 13  
Married 43  
Divorced/ Widowed 5  
Total 100  
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
TABLE C: CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 CREDIT EDUC 
EMPL
OY 
AGE 
SQAG
E 
MARR
IED 
UNCE
R 
GEND
ER 
RURA
L 
HHSIZ
E 
SPECI
AL 
QPOO
REST 
EMER INSU 
CREDIT 1.000              
EDUC -0.004 1.000             
EMPLO
Y 
0.120 0.001 1.000            
AGE 0.127 -0.365 0.195 1.000           
SQAGE 0.119 -0.365 0.141 0.986 1.000          
MARRI
ED 
0.086 -0.151 0.211 0.427 0.351 1.000         
UNCER 0.042 -0.130 0.253 0.268 0.265 0.058 1.000        
GENDE
R 
-0.105 -0.168 -0.492 0.002 0.006 0.085 -0.188 1.000       
RURAL 0.008 -0.184 0.078 -0.070 -0.069 0.060 0.025 0.008 1.000      
HHSIZE 0.004 -0.088 0.005 -0.070 -0.067 -0.116 -0.033 -0.033 0.166 1.000     
SPECIA
L 
-0.019 0.036 -0.003 0.005 0.008 -0.032 0.006 -0.004 -0.150 -0.028 1.000    
QPOOR
EST 
0.008 -0.313 0.036 -0.009 -0.004 -0.022 0.101 0.000 0.311 0.103 -0.082 1.000   
EMER 0.011 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.003 -0.013 -0.031 -0.036 -0.016 1.000  
INSU 0.075 0.274 0.036 -0.053 -0.014 -0.174 -0.095 -0.164 -0.132 0.001 0.044 -0.191 0.005 1.000 
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TABLE D: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES (ALL QUINTILES) 
Dependent variable: 𝐒𝐢 
CREDIT  0.128 
(0.107) 
0.166 
(0.035)** 
0.401 
(0.000)*** 
0.398 
(0.000)*** 
0.294 
(0.000)*** 
Individual characteristics     
EDUC 
0.623 
(0.000)*** 
0.676 
(0.000)*** 
   
EMPLOY 
0.182 
(0.000)*** 
0.396 
(0.000)*** 
   
AGE 
0.086 
(0.000)*** 
    
SQAGE 
-0.0008 
(0.000)*** 
0.0002 
(0.000)*** 
   
MARRIED 
0.140 
(0.701) 
0.168 
(0.561) 
   
UNCER 
0.041 
(0.052)** 
0.183 
(0.034)** 
   
GENDER 
 0.234 
(0.000)*** 
   
Household characteristics     
RURAL 
  -0.305 
(0.000)*** 
-0.149 
(0.000)*** 
 
HSIZE 
  -0.071 
(0.000)*** 
-0.070 
(0.000)*** 
 
SPECIAL 
  0.205 
(0.000)*** 
0.168 
(0.000)*** 
 
QPOOREST 
   -0.549 
(0.000)*** 
 
 Health Emergency     
EMERG 
    0.142 
(0.100)* 
INSU 
    0.361 
(0.000)*** 
        Figures in parentheses indicate P-value>z 
       *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
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TABLE E: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES (ALL QUINTILES) 
Dependent variable: 𝐒𝐢𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐎𝐑 
CREDIT  0.119 
(0.089)** 
0.166 
(0.018)** 
0.383 
(0.000)*** 
0.386 
(0.000)*** 
0.302 
(0.000)*** 
Individual characteristics     
EDUC 
0.461 
(0.000)*** 
0.522 
(0.000)*** 
   
EMPLOY 
0.156 
(0.000)*** 
0.341 
(0.000)*** 
   
AGE 
0.085 
(0.000)*** 
0.079 
(0.000)*** 
   
SQAGE 
-0.0009 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0008 
(0.000)*** 
   
MARRIED 
0.113 
(0.006)** 
0.101 
(0.012)** 
   
UNCER 
0.003 
(0.072)* 
0.028 
(0.023)** 
   
GENDER 
 0.337 
(0.000)*** 
   
Household characteristics     
RURAL 
  -0.202 
(0.000)*** 
-0.071 
(0.012)** 
 
HSIZE 
  -0.063 
(0.000)*** 
-0.061 
(0.000)*** 
 
SPECIAL 
  0.197 
(0.000)*** 
0.164 
(0.001)*** 
 
QPOOREST 
   -0.463 
(0.000)*** 
 
Health Emergency     
EMERG 
    -0.064 
(0.057)* 
INSU 
    0.282 
(0.000)*** 
        Figures in parentheses indicate P-value>z 
       *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
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TABLE F: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES (ALL QUINTILES) 
Dependent variable: 𝐒𝐢FOR 
CREDIT  -0.038 
(0.736) 
-0.063 
(0.574) 
-0.249 
(0.033)** 
-0.256 
(0.032)** 
0.294 
(0.343) 
Individual characteristics     
    EDUC 
1.022 
(0.000)*** 
0.988 
(0.000)*** 
   
EMPLOY 
0.176 
(0.001)*** 
0.099 
(0.010)*** 
   
AGE 
0.067 
(0.000)*** 
0.073 
(0.000)*** 
   
SQAGE 
-0.0004 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0005 
(0.000)*** 
   
MARRIED 
-0.369 
(0.000)*** 
-0.374 
(0.001)*** 
   
UNCER 
0.171 
(0.001)** 
0.176 
(0.001)*** 
   
GENDER 
 -0.153 
(0.009)** 
   
Household characteristics     
RURAL 
  -0.503 
(0.000)*** 
-0.341 
(0.000)*** 
 
HSIZE 
  -0.076 
(0.000)*** 
-0.073 
(0.000)*** 
 
SPECIAL 
  0.146 
(0.043)** 
0.106 
(0.143) 
 
QPOOREST 
   -0.671 
(0.036)** 
 
Health Emergency     
EMERG 
    0.291 
(0.027)** 
INSU 
    0.413 
(0.000)*** 
        Figures in parentheses indicate P-value>z 
       *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
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TABLE G: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES (POOR QUINTILES) 
Dependent variable: 𝐒𝐢𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐎𝐑 
CREDIT  0.106 
(0.345) 
0.144 
(0.098)* 
0.267 
(0.018)** 
0.248 
(0.000)*** 
Individual characteristics    
EDUC 
0.139 
(0.019)* 
0.196 
(0.001)*** 
  
EMPLOY 
0.193 
(0.001)*** 
0.313 
(0.000)*** 
  
AGE 
0.069 
(0.000)*** 
0.065 
(0.000)*** 
  
SQAGE 
-0.0007 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0007 
(0.000)*** 
  
MARRIED 
-0.008 
(0.991) 
-0.001 
(0.981) 
  
UNCER 
0.067 
(0.019)** 
0.094 
(0.077)* 
  
GENDER 
 0.236 
(0.000)*** 
  
Household characteristics 
   
RURAL 
  -0.010 
(0.085)* 
 
HSIZE 
  -0.066 
(0.000)*** 
 
SPECIAL 
  0.110 
(0.026)** 
 
Health Emergency    
EMERG 
   -0.046 
(0.081)* 
INSU 
   0.084 
(0.015)** 
        Figures in parentheses indicate P-value>z 
       *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
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